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Abstract
In this paper, a hybrid simulation model of the agent-based model and cooperative game theory is used in a humanin-the-loop experiment to study the effect of human demographic characteristics in situations where they make
strategic coalition decisions. Agent-based modeling (ABM) is a computational method that can reveal emergent
phenomenon from interactions between agents in an environment. It has been suggested in organizational psychology
that ABM could model human behavior more holistically than other modeling methods. Cooperative game theory is
a method that models strategic coalitions formation. Three characteristics (age, education, and gender) were
considered in the experiment to see if there is a difference between decisions made by humans with different
characteristics. The final coalition, in which the human is a member, was compared to an ideal coalition known as a
core coalition. The experimental results show that there is no significant difference in strategic decisions due to their
characteristics. In other words, none of the considered demographic information has an impact on human strategic
choices.
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1. Introduction

There is a challenge in agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS) to model human behavior [1]. Human decisionmaking is one part of human behavior. Using ABMS to model human decisions is of interest in various fields such as
psychology and management [2, 3]. As Hughes, et al. [2] believed, ABMS could model human behavior more
holistically than other modeling methods in organizational psychology. Human decision-making is a broad field of
study; it includes a variety of different types of decisions and how those decisions are affected by different
circumstances. In this paper, our focus is only on one type of human decision, which are decisions in the context of
strategic coalition formation. A hybrid simulation model of the agent-based model and cooperative game theory is
used in our human-in-the-loop experiment to study strategic coalition formation decisions, which is presented in this
paper.
To model human behavior with ABMS precisely, the agents are required to behave similarly to how a human behaves
in the same scenario. So, it is necessary to understand factors that may affect human behavior. In this paper, we try to
understand which human demographic characteristics; such as age, education, and gender; influence the strategic
decisions that a human would make in the context of strategic coalition formation. A human-in-the-loop experiment
was used to collect data to help answer this question.
In our experiment, a type of game in cooperative game theory, known as the glove game, was incorporated within an
ABMS to provide a strategic coalition formation context. Also, core stability, which is a major solution concept in
cooperative game theory, was considered as the solution concept in our experiment. The resultant stable partition of
agents in coalitions is known as core partition.
The glove game, also known as the shoe game, is a standard cooperative game, along with exchange economies or
voting games, that is used in experimental game theory [4, 5]. In the glove game, players have a different number of
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left-hand and/or right-hand gloves. Players make coalitions based on the profit which they can gain by pooling their
gloves together. Each pair of gloves provides a reward of one, and the total reward of a coalition is divided equally
among the players participating in that coalition regardless of how many gloves a player adds to the coalition. Players
join, or defect from, a coalition in a way that increases the reward which they can earn. The outcome of the game is a
coalition structure. A coalition structure is a covering collection of all disjoint coalitions. This coalition structure is a
core partition if there exists no coalition that all members of that coalition prefer that coalition to their current coalition
[6]. In other words, there is no incentive for members to leave their current coalition in the partition and form a new
coalition. The set of core partitions form the core of the game. We refer to any coalition in this core partition as a core
coalition.
In this experiment, a hybrid human-in-the-loop agent-based simulation was used, which means that we used only one
human in each game and the rest are computerized agents. Seven different glove games are considered for a human to
play, ranging from easy to hard. Games become more sophisticated by increasing the number of computerized agents
in the game. For instance, the initial game starts with one computerized agent and one human, but the last game
includes six computerized agents and one human. Participants were asked to answer a questionnaire with demographic
information such as age, education, and gender before the experiment starts. We should note that the consistency of
computerized agents’ behavior to human behavior in the context of strategic coalition formation in our model was
ascertained in our previous study [7].
In the literature, there exists a variety of papers that applied game theory, ABMS, and human subject experiments in
one study to investigate human behavior in different contexts [8-13]. In all these studies, game theory is used to
conduct human subject experimentation with supporting results outputted from ABMS or revealing rules that can be
used as input data to develop ABMS. We will next discuss studies from both scenarios.
For the case in which human subject experimentation plays a supporter role and validates results outputted from
ABMS, Sohn [8] studied human decisions in the context of market exchange by applying the coordination game model
in ABMS. Also, Li, et al. [9] incorporated Janus game rules to ABMS to simultaneously study cooperation and
competition behavior. In all papers, a human experiment was conducted at the end to validate results gained from
ABMS.
On the other hand, in a situation where the output from a human subject experiment is used as an input to develop
ABMS, Takko [11] modeled risk perception and rationality behind human decisions in agent-based model with data
received from human experiments so that the model can replicate human behavior precisely. In the competitive
environment, Coen [12] extracting rules from social dilemma human experiment on how people behave in the context
and used the rules to construct ABMS that discover effective decisions in the competitive environment. Dal Forno and
Merlone [13] used ground theory to reveal human behavior rules from social dilemma human experiment in an
incentive situation; so that the rules can be used as an input to the agent-based model to check the validity of results
from ground theory.
In this section, although all works used an agent-based model and/or human subject experiment with the application
of game theory interchangeably to address research problems, none of them used cooperative game theory and humanin-loop simulation in the same experiment. Our hybrid human-in-loop simulation was used within the human subject
experiment to study effect of demographic information on human strategic decisions, as opposed to being used
separately to validate it.
The reason behind using simulation in this research is that; at any game state, the human player has 64 possible
coalitions that they can suggest. For each suggested coalition, the effected computerized players will need to determine
whether they will join the suggested coalition or not. Their decision is affected by the current game state (coalition
structure) and there are literally thousands of game states. As such, scripting what each computerized agent does in
every game state would require thousands of lines of code; far more than the code needed to create a simulation of the
game. This, along with the need for stochastic play by the computerized agent, is why a simulation is used in this
experiment.

2. Experiment

A human-in-the-loop experiment was conducted to investigate which human demographic characteristics affect
human decision-making in the context of strategic coalition formation. We recruited 31 participants with various
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demographic characteristics, mostly from the Old Dominion University community, by word of mouth. Each
experimental trial consisted of several glove games being played. Each game involved only one participant, and the
rest of the players were computerized agents; this was to remove the complex inter-personal behavior that may appear
if multiple human participants interact in the game. Computerize agent behavior was driven by the ABMSCORE
algorithm [14]. The details of how the algorithm was adapted for the experiment can be found in [15]. We were able
to show that the agent behavior generated by the algorithm was consistent with actual human behavior in the context
of our strategic coalition formation game [7].
A summary of the experimental protocol is as follows. Each participant was first asked to complete a questionnaire to
collect demographic information and then shown a disclaimer about their rights in the experiment. An instructor then
starts to play two test glove games conducted with cards to help the human understand the game’s rules. After that,
the human is required to play five computerized games on the Graphical User Interface (GUI) used in the simulation.
The GUI of a particular game is shown in Figure 1 with 3 players having different number of right (blue) and left (red)
gloves that they would use to form a coalition and the coalition will get rewarded for each pair of gloves.

Figure 1: Graphical User Interface (GUI) used in the simulation for the third test game (Human is player zero in all
games)
After the card games, the human is required to play three computerized test games on the GUI to make sure that a
complete understanding of the game’s processes and rules was achieved. After understanding the glove game is
achieved by the human player, the last two trial games were played. These trial games’ results were used for the
analysis. An overview of the experimental protocol is provided in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Flow diagram of a trial’s protocol involving a human subject with computer interaction. (Extracted
from [15])
Demographic information and glove game outputs are two major data that were collected from the experiment.
Demographic information; such as age, education, and gender; was collected before the trial started. Below are the
questions and possible choices for each participant to choose from:
•
•
•

Select your age "18-20", "21-29", "30-39", "40-49", "50-59", "60 or older", "Prefer not to answer."
Select your gender “Female,” “Male,” “Other,” “Prefer not to answer.”
Your highest level of education “Less than a high school degree,” “High school degree,” “Some college
credit, no degree,” “Associate degree,” “Bachelor’s degree,” “Master’s degree,” “Doctoral degree,” “Prefer
not to answer.”

The distributions of demographic information from participants are shown in Figure 3.

AGE

40-49,
7

60 or
older,
1

GENDER
18-20,
3
21-29,
6

30-39,
14

EDUCATION
Less than
high school, 1

Male, 12

Master,
9

Female, 19

High
school
,3
Doctoral
,8

Bachelor
, 10

Figure 3: Distribution of demographic information from participants
As we can see in Figure 3, the population of participants in the game was very diverse. Also, we should note that no
identifiable information was collected from participants as our commitment to our Internal Review Board (IRB)
requirements. In the following section, we are going to discuss the results of the experiment.

3. Results and Discussions

In this section, we show the outcomes of our statistical analysis, i.e., chi-square tests of independence, on the results
generated from the last two games in the experimental trials to investigate the impact of demographic information on
the strategic decisions made by humans. This means that we had (2 x 31) 62 data points to use for each test.
To understand the difference, we will compare the final coalition, which a human is a member after the experiment
completed by a human participant, to the ideal coalition known as the core coalition, in which a human should be a
member but is not. So, the research question is “Does the characteristic affect the outcome of being a core coalition?”
As we discussed in the introduction section, core coalition refers to any coalition in the core partition.
All null hypotheses were that there is no difference between each population group. Also, we should note that all tests
were conducted at the 95% confidence level or alpha equal to 0.05.
For analyzing the education level, we grouped humans into two categories as a graduate who has a master’s or doctoral
degree and an undergraduate level, anything lower than a master’s degree. The population at the graduate level is 17,
and it is 14 for the undergraduate level. The first alternative hypothesis is “there is a difference between players with
graduate/undergraduate degree in the final coalition which they are a member.” As we mentioned before, all data
compare to the ideal coalition named the core coalition. The result from the chi-square test is available in Table 1.
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Chi-squared
Graduate
Undergraduate
p-value=0.70

Table 1: Chi-squared test for education level and final coalition.
Member a coalition in the core
Not a member of a coalition in the core
15
19
11
17

The chi-square test with p-value=0.70 in Table 1 tells us that we cannot reject the null hypothesis. So, there is no
difference between the final coalition in which a graduate or undergraduate human is a member.
For the gender analysis, the alternative hypothesis is “there is a difference between female/male players’ final coalition
in which they are a member.” As shown in Figure 3, the female and male population is 19 and 12, respectively. So,
the result from chi-square is shown in Table 2.
Chi-squared
Female
Male
p-value=0.31

Table 2: Chi-squared test for gender and final coalition.
Member a coalition in the core
Not a member of a coalition in the core
14
24
12
12

Because the p-value is equal to 0.31, which is greater than the alpha=0.05, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. In
other words, there is no difference between the final coalition in which a male or female is a member.
As we interpreted from Figure 3 distribution of player’s age is vast such because the most populated interval is 30-39,
we divide the population into two groups: “30-39” and “others.” The alternative hypothesis is “there exists a
relationship between player’s age and the final coalition.” The result from the chi-square test is shown in Table 3.
Chi-squared
30-39
others
p-value=0.70

Table 3: Chi-squared test for age and final coalition.
Member a coalition in the core
Not a member of a coalition in the core
11
17
15
19

The result is not significant because the p-value is large, and it is greater than the alpha value. Therefore, there is no
evidence for a relationship between a player’s age and be/not a member of a coalition in the core.
To make sure that our sample size is sufficient in this study, we did a power calculation based on the chi-squared test
results and our dataset with 62 records [16]. Assuming a large effective size (0.5), the power of research was shown
to be 0.97. This number was greatly reduced for smaller effect sizes, as expected from a small sample like ours, but
we can generally conclude that our sample size was sufficient to provide some evidence of our conclusions. Our
sample contains two different game outcomes and independence between a participant in two data points, the
assumptions make it inappropriate to make a stronger conclusion.
Results from chi-square tests on demographic information tell us that none of the demographic information impacts
the strategic decision that the humans’ made in the context of coalition formation. In other words, humans with
different characteristics make similar strategic decisions in strategic coalition formation. Further analysis using a
combination of demographic information or considering different demographic information could be conducted to
strengthen our findings.

4. Conclusion

A human-in-the-loop experiment was conducted to understand which human characteristics as age, education, and
gender might affect the strategic coalition formation decisions made by human participants. To analyze the situation,
the final coalition, in which a participant is a member at the end of each game trial, was compared to the ideal coalitions
known as the core coalition for the same game. Our results showed that none of the demographic information seems
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to affect the strategic decision which the participants made. The eagerness toward understanding the impact of human
characteristics on decision-making in the strategic environment was to find out factors that may cause differences in
the outcome of human strategic decisions. This understanding may help researchers and business owners to deal with
the practical decision-making environment in the strategic context. Further analysis, such as considering more
demographic information, a combination of demographic information, or making changes to the questionnaire
questions’ choices, could be conducted.
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